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ANONYMOUS BLOGGERS AND DEFAMATION: 
BALANCING INTERESTS ON THE INTERNET 
S. ELIZABETH MALLOY∗ 
Professors Reynolds, Volokh, and Solove have each commented on the 
relationship between libel law and the ever-growing “blogosphere.” This 
comment agrees as well as disagrees with several points from other 
authors’ opinions, as well as going further in arguing for the protection of 
libel plaintiffs facing defamatory comments from anonymous bloggers. 
In his article, “Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts,”1 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds comments on the lack of big-name libel suits 
against anonymous bloggers, and explains why blogging is its own culture 
and deserving of its own standards of review by the courts. He argues that 
such suits are rare because most bloggers do not have deep pockets, the 
threat of suit is frowned upon by the blogging community, “actual malice” 
is difficult to prove, and fast corrections of incorrect information are easier 
than in other mediums of communication.2 In addition, he argues that 
blogs have “mutated” and become more commercial and journalistic in 
nature. Because of the changing nature of blogs, Reynolds argues that 
perhaps judicial review similar to that of slander is appropriate for 
blogging defamation suits. In addition, he argues that the plaintiff should 
be required to meet a high standard of proof for harm and that such 
comments must be taken in the context they are written because of the 
unique culture of blogging.3 
While Reynolds calls for a far more deferential standard for bloggers, 
Daniel J. Solove, in his article “A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and 
Privacy in the Blogosphere,” argues that bloggers should have greater 
accountability to their audiences.4 He argues that “We see blogging as 
something that enhances the freedom of the little guy,” but at the same 
 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Blog: Health Law Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/healthlawprof_blog. Many thanks to Professor Paul Caron for 
inviting me to participate in this groundbreaking symposium. Thank you to my wonderful research 
assistant Rebekah Van Drake for her help with this comment. Thank you to Ryan Martin for 
introducing me to this interesting topic.  
 1. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1157 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 1157–60. 
 3. Id. at 1166–67. 
 4. Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the Blogosphere, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1195 (2006). 
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time warns against affording bloggers too much speech protection.5 Even 
though it is argued that free speech enhances “individual autonomy,” 
political discussion, and a free flow of ideas, Solove argues that privacy 
has the same goals and benefits and should be given greater deference.6 
Though recognizing the difficulty of fashioning a new balancing test to 
weigh the competing interests of privacy and free speech, Professor 
Solove argues that current laws regulating the Internet provide a form of 
immunity that may lead to irresponsibility and a lessening of privacy 
protection.7 
Though Reynolds and Solove each discuss issues relating to blog 
defamation suits, this paper takes the discussion further and addresses the 
issue of the proper standard to be applied to revealing the identity of the 
anonymous blogger who faces allegations of defamation.8 
As more and more people create personal websites and blogs, courts 
are more frequently asked to rule on questions related to the Internet 
boom. Specifically, an issue has arisen concerning what standard to apply 
in defamation suits brought against anonymous bloggers.9 Courts have 
wrestled with producing an appropriate standard for revealing the identity 
of an anonymous blogger who posts allegedly defamatory material on a 
 
 
 5. Id. at 1196. 
 6. Id. at 1198–99. 
 7. Id. at 1199–1200. In an earlier article, Professor Solove noted the difficulty in defining 
privacy and the concept of autonomy and thus the resulting problems in developing an appropriately 
protective standard. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2006) 
(arguing that the broad concept of privacy is “about everything, and therefore it appears to be 
nothing.”). For a further examination of Professor Solove’s views on the importance of privacy 
protections, see Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protection Against 
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L. J. 967, 988–98 (2003). 
 8. The Supreme Court has affirmed in several cases that the First Amendment protects a 
speaker’s choice to remain anonymous. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 62 (1960); McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995). Protection for anonymity has further been 
recognized on the Internet. See John Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 
2001). 
 9. A claim for defamation involving an anonymous defendant has a unique procedure in that, 
before the trial, a hearing will be held to determine whether the identity of the defendant must be 
disclosed so that discovery can proceed. This Comment focuses on what standard courts should apply 
during such show of cause hearings to determine whether an anonymous defendant’s identity should 
be revealed. For a thorough review of some of the recent case law and the issues it raises for the First 
Amendment as well as defamation claims, see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: 
Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000); Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking 
“John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. 
L. REV. 795, 797 (2004); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and 
Anonymous Speech (Minn. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 06-37, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=925376 (providing guidance to legislatures and courts for regulating 
anonymous speakers as well as the rights of individuals to be free from defamatory comments and 
maintain privacy). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/16
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message board or website.10 Recently, in Doe v. Cahill,11 the Delaware 
Supreme Court created a strict standard that makes it extremely difficult 
for defamation victims to bring suit against anonymous bloggers. The 
standard created is far too sympathetic to anonymous bloggers and fails to 
address important issues facing victims of defamation. 
In Doe v. Cahill, the plaintiff, a town council member, brought a 
defamation suit against the defendant for false comments made on the 
“Smyrna/Clayton Issues Blog,” a website dedicated to a free-ranging 
discussion of local politics.12 The lower court applied a “good faith” 
standard, which required that a plaintiff prove “(1) that they had a 
legitimate, good faith basis upon which to bring the underlying claim; (2) 
that the identifying information sought was directly and materially related 
to their claim; and (3) that the information could not be obtained from any 
other source.”13 Application of this standard in the lower court indicated 
that the plaintiffs had a good faith reason to require the identity of the 
blogger in the defamation suit. However, the Supreme Court of Delaware 
rejected the application of this standard, finding that “[the] ‘good faith’ 
standard is too easily satisfied to protect sufficiently a defendant’s right to 
speak anonymously.”14 
The Delaware Supreme Court instead applied a summary judgment 
standard, which is far stricter than either the good faith standard applied by 
the lower court or the motion to dismiss intermediate standard applied by 
various other courts in Internet defamation suits.15 The court held, “the 
summary judgment standard is the appropriate test by which to strike the 
balance between a defamation plaintiff’s right to protect his reputation and 
 
 
 10. For examples of recent tests applied to anonymous bloggers, see Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John 
Does 1–20, No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL 22149380 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (applying a totality of circumstances 
approach to plaintiff’s request that defendant’s identity be disclosed and deciding that the defendant’s 
statements, when viewed in the context in which they were made, could only be seen as opinions and 
thus immune from defamation suits); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001) (requiring plaintiff to notify defendant, set forth statements plaintiff believes to be 
actionable, and set forth evidence supporting each element of the cause of action with the court 
balancing the need for disclosure against the defendant’s First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 
261 Va. 350 (Va. 2001) (applying a “good faith” standard and noting that the right to speak 
anonymously is not absolute). 
 11. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
 12. The John Doe defendant criticized Mr. Cahill’s performance as a city councilman, calling 
him a “divisive impediment to any kind of cooperate movement” and further remarking on Mr. 
Cahill’s unstable mental state and paranoia. Id. at 454, 457.  
 13. Id. at 454–55. 
 14. Id. at 458. 
 15. See supra note 10 for recent case law. 
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a defendant’s right to exercise free speech anonymously.”16 The two-part 
standard requires a plaintiff to take reasonable efforts to notify the 
anonymous defendant and to present enough evidence to establish a prima 
facie case for each element of the claim.17 However, this court ruled public 
figure plaintiffs are not required to provide evidence of actual malice, 
because that evidence is not within their control before they know the 
identity of the blogger.18 
In making its ruling, the court did “not rely on the nature of the internet 
as a basis to justify . . . application of the legal standard,” and made “no 
distinction between communications made on the internet and those made 
through other traditional forms of media.”19 Rather, the court noted that 
“[t]he internet is a unique democratizing medium unlike anything that has 
come before,” and “[t]he advent of the internet dramatically changed the 
nature of public discourse . . . . [S]peakers can bypass mainstream media 
to speak directly” to the public.20 In addition, the court ruled that 
information on the Internet is not as reliable as other mediums. It argues 
that blogs are often full of grammar and spelling problems, hyperbole, and 
vulgarities. Thus, the court argued that a reasonable person would not 
construe a blog as stating facts. The court applied this reasoning in Cahill 
and found that a reasonable person would not have assumed the blog 
statements were facts about the council member; therefore, the lower court 
decision was reversed.21 
Several problems arise with the application of the standard created in 
Cahill, as well as with its characterization of the Internet and anonymous 
blogs. First, the standard is highly deferential to anonymous bloggers. Not 
only must the plaintiffs provide enough evidence to satisfy the summary 
judgment burden, but they must also deal with a characterization of the 
Internet that makes the task nearly impossible. The Cahill court focuses on 
the crude nature of the writings on the Internet as merely indicative of 
opinion. However, as the court notes itself, the Internet provides the ability 
to reach millions of people at the press of a button.22 Although the ability 
to post anonymously on the Internet allows certain individuals to express 
their beliefs without fear of retaliation or discrimination, it also protects 
 
 
 16. Cahill, 884 A.3d at 460. 
 17. Id. at 460–61. 
 18. Id. at 464. 
 19. Id. at 465. 
 20. Id. at 455. 
 21. Id. at 466. 
 22. Id.  
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careless and irresponsible individuals from the threat of lawsuits for their 
false comments.  
Most importantly, the Cahill court fails to look at the repercussions for 
those who fall victim to these online anonymous bloggers. For instance, 
employers who do background checks on possible future employees may 
discover blog information that is false. If employment decisions are based 
even in part on these bloggers’ comments, victims suffer both emotional 
and economic losses.23 More ominously, some defamatory postings 
involve off-line consequences even more harmful than humiliation or job 
loss. These defamatory postings, such as those falsely accusing plaintiffs 
of a crime or of engaging in an unpopular activity, may expose plaintiffs 
to charges of treason or even to threats of violence. For instance, if an 
individual is falsely accused of pedophilia, local residents may take the 
law into their own hands.24 Doctors, who an anonymous blogger alleges 
perform illegal late-term abortions or abortions on minors without proper 
consent, may find it necessary to hire extra security or close their 
practice.25 In today’s post-9/11 world, allegations that an individual has 
ties to a terrorist organization may lead to unpleasant interactions with 
government officials or worse.26 
Similarly, a second problem with the court’s opinion centers on its 
characterization of blogs in general. The court indicated that, because of 
the misspellings, hyperbole, and general nature of blogs, a reasonable 
person would likely conclude that they only represent opinions.27 This 
characterization seems to almost negate the need for a standard. If a 
plaintiff brings a defamation suit he is almost guaranteed to fail because 
 
 
 23. For a discussion of employers’ use of monitoring devices to review employee blogs and other 
webpostings, see Rafael Gely and Leonard Bierman, Workplace Blogs and Workers’ Privacy, 66 LA. 
L. REV. 1079, 1084–88 (2006) (discussing cases involving the termination of employees for their work 
and non-work posts on blogs). 
 24. See, e.g., Associated Press, Lawyer Accused in Stabbing Death of Neighbor; Father 
Allegedly Suspected Neighbor of Molesting his Young Daughter, available at http://www.msnbc.com/ 
id/14610951 (Sept. 1, 2006). 
 25. Pro-life activists have been known to justify violence against abortion providers in pursuit of 
their goal to stop abortions. See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 
1130, 1154–56 (D. Or. 1999) (granting an injunction under Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 
prohibiting publication of defendant’s website and poster with intent to threaten abortion providers). 
For a further discussion concerning the regulation of such harm advocacy speech, see S. Elizabeth 
Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting 
Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1214–15 (2000). 
 26. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s Extraordinary 
Rendition Program, 81 NEW YORKER 106 (2005); see also Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006) 
(case of Jose Padilla, a United States citizen held for three years without charges as an “enemy 
combatant”).  
 27. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 466.  
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the court has characterized personal blogs as difficult to interpret as fact by 
a reasonable person. In addition, it creates an impetus for an anonymous 
blogger to incorporate misspellings and vulgarities to mask statements and 
evade the summary judgment standard. Though the court holds “[w]e do 
not hold as a matter of law that statements made on a blog or in a chat 
room can never be defamatory,” it seems to characterize blogs in such a 
way as to make it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to meet their burden.28 
A third problem with the court’s opinion is that it fails to provide a 
plausible judicial outlet for plaintiffs and, instead, implies that 
extrajudicial measures are more adequate. The court holds that, unlike 
other mediums, a plaintiff in a defamation suit involving the Internet has 
extrajudicial relief.29 A victim may log on to the same blog or website and 
refute the comments made by the anonymous blogger. It held that “[t]he 
plaintiff can thereby easily correct any misstatements or falsehoods, 
respond to character attacks, and generally set the record straight.”30 
However, the court seems to misstate the ease with which a defamation 
victim may create his own relief. Chances are slim that the victim will 
reach the same audience that has read the false statements.31 It seems that 
a victim will find little solace in hoping that he has reached the audience 
that read the defamatory comments. The suggestion by the court seems to 
be a veiled attempt to justify the summary judgment standard by 
suggesting other means that a victim can utilize. A victim of defamation is 
more likely to want the identity of the person known to silence them from 
making further accusations. Instead, the court’s suggestion will likely lead 
to a war of words on the Internet, with neither side having any motivation 
to end the retaliation. Tort law is meant to preserve parties from retaliating 
on their own, but this court seems to endorse personal retribution to some 
degree. 
Finally, the court, though seemingly contradicting itself, holds that the 
Internet will not be distinguished from any other medium of 
communication;32 however, the Internet is quite different than other 
mediums in its ease of access, permanence, and pervasiveness. Gossip 
through newspapers and even through people may take time, but it can 
take merely seconds on the Internet. A person can make a false statement 
out of anger and spite under the guise of anonymity much more easily than 
 
 
 28. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 467 n.78. 
 29. Id. at 464.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 465.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/16
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through other mediums of communication. Once those comments are 
made, their permanence increases their viability. Words are saved on 
pages, saved to personal computers, printed, and spread through e-mail.33 
One who falls victim to anonymous blogging has little ability to 
completely destroy the statements.34 In addition, as the court notes, 
nothing controls what postings are permitted on the Internet, which leads 
to pervasive and unregulated comments.35 The court finds no legal 
distinction between the Internet and classic mediums of communication 
while at the same time illustrating the multiple differences between them. 
The standard created in Cahill does not address the problems of ease of 
access, permanence, or pervasiveness of defamatory information on the 
Internet. 
It is important not to silence communication on the Internet, but it is 
just as important not to silence victims of defamation. The standard 
created in Doe v. Cahill is strict and gives victims of anonymous blog 
defamation little grounds for recovery. The Internet is a different medium 
of communication and should not necessarily be judged on the grammar 
and spelling of the content, but on the written words. Defamation victims 
must have recourse against those anonymously making defamatory 
comments about them because of the relative permanence of postings on 
the Internet and the lack of regulation given to this medium of 
communication. Although legislative and administrative regulation of the 
Internet may be unnecessary, court oversight in the form of the protections 
provided by defamation suits appears necessary to provide an appropriate 
balance to the dueling rights presented by the case of anonymous bloggers. 
 
 
 33. Orin S. Kerr, Blog and the Legal Academy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1127 (2006). 
 34. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through 
Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 927 (2006). See Google Cache feature, 
http://www.google.com/help/features.html (“Google takes a snapshot of each page examined as it 
crawls the web and caches these as a back up in case the original page is unavailable. If you click on 
the ‘cached’ link you will see the web page as it looked when we indexed it.”). 
 35. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 465. 
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